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Remittances and Gender: 
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence 
 
In this paper, we focus on network- and gender-specific determinants of remittances, which 
are often explained theoretically by way of intra-family contracts. We develop a basic formal 
concept that includes aspects of the transnational network and derive hypotheses from it. For 
our empirical investigation, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) for the years 2001-2006. Our findings show: first, the fact that foreign women remit 
less money than foreign men can be explained by the underlying transnational network 
contract. Second, remittances sent by foreigners and naturalized immigrants have at least 
partly different determinants. Acquiring German citizenship increases the probability of family 
reunification in the destination country and decreases remittances. Third, the structure of the 
existing social network in Germany and the network structure in the home country both play 
important roles in explaining remittances. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Migration and the existence of family and friend networks in the home country are 
crucial preconditions for remittances. Feminist critique has revealed how gender roles 
and a gender-specific division of labor shape the migratory process (Carlota Ramirez, 
Mar Garcia Dominguez, and Julia Miguez Morais 2005). With remittances, women’s 
economic importance within the transnational network increases (Manuel Orozco, 
Lindsay Lowell, and Johanna Schneider 2006). In many cases, sending financial 
remittances home makes women important players in the transnational network
1, and 
this in turn can provide them a higher degree of social independence. To understand 
remittance patterns, it is also important to understand the legal situation of the 
immigrant in the destination country. Acquiring destination country citizenship has 
implications for the likelihood of chain migration, for the immigrant’s social 
integration into the country of destination, and therefore for remittances. Remittance 
decisions of males and females might thus be affected in a similar way by the 
acquisition of destination country citizenship.  
Up to now, standard economic theory on remittances has mainly focused on 
the analysis of international labor migration. A growing strand of this literature has 
begun considering household characteristics (Edward Funkhouser 1992) and family 
ties (Jacob Mincer 1978; Brenda Davis Root and Gordon De Jong 1991) as important 
aspects of migration. In general, they distinguish between joint migration and split 
migration. In the case of joint migration, the entire household moves to the destination 
country. In the case of split migration, on the other hand, the composition of the 
household in the home country changes but still survives. Split household models 
                                                 
1 The transnational network is defined, in our case, as immediate and extended family and friends in the 
home as well as in the destination country. 
  3have potentially rich implications for predicting remittance behavior by women and 
men (Lisa Pfeiffer, Susan Richter, Peri Fletcher, and Edward Taylor 2008).  
Within this context, remittances are usually seen as the result of international 
transnational family contracts for insurance and investment (Robert Lucas and Oded 
Stark 1985; Mark Rosenzweig 1988; Oded Stark 1995; Bernard Poirine 1997; 
Andrew Foster and Mark Rosenzweig 2001; Reena Agarwal and Andrew Horowitz 
2002). There are strong arguments that these contracts are gender-sensitive. From 
empirical evidence, it is known that in some cases, social norms prevent females from 
independent migration and thus constrain remittances. In addition, gender roles might 
influence the power of the immigrant within the transnational network and might 
thereby affect the amount remitted. However, standard economic theory on 
remittances fails to provide a more detailed analysis of these intra-network contracts. 
Yet there is an extensive body of empirical studies seeking to understand how 
immigrants send money home and to describe their patterns of remittance behavior: 
who sends what, what (and how much) is sent to whom, how often, which channels 
are utilized, and how the money is “spent” by the recipients. Quite distinct cultural 
and gendered remittance patterns have been examined in what is sent by whom 
(Sherri Grasmuck and Patricia Pessar 1991; Sarah Curran 1995). So far, the existing 
empirical literature on gender-specific remittance patterns has not inspired detailed 
theoretical approaches on this topic.  
Therefore, and in line with the growing literature on gender patterns in 
international migration and remittances, we intend to shed light on the linkages 
between gender, the structure of the transnational network, and the amount remitted. 
Our empirical case comes from Germany, where we draw upon secondary data from 
immigrants with and without German citizenship (mainly citizens of Turkey, Italy, 
  4and the countries of ex-Yugoslavia) for the years 2001-06.
2 Germany is one of the 
most important countries sending remittances. About 6.7 million foreigners, of whom 
almost 50 percent are women, currently live in Germany (Federal Statistical Office 
2010). It has been reported in the literature that male immigrants to Germany remit 
more than female immigrants, even after controlling for income (Lucie Merkle and 
Klaus Zimmermann 1992; Ursula Oser 1995; Elke Holst and Mechthild Schrooten 
2006).
3  Up to now, however, the research has failed to explain this effect. Our 
objective is to demonstrate that the structure of the transnational network and the legal 
status of the immigrant are essential to understanding differences in financial 
remittance patterns of male and female immigrants to Germany.  
2.  Research Insights 
 
Standard theoretical models explain migration and remittances based on economic 
considerations (Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark 1995; Edward Funkhouser 1995), while 
neglecting differences in female and male migration patterns and remittances 
decisions. However, a growing number of applied studies have stressed that 
“migration is a profoundly gendered process” (Shawn Malia Kanaiaupuni 
2000:1312). Basically it can be assumed that the economic returns of education 
(human capital) depend on the degree of labor market segmentation by gender in the 
destination country (Pfeiffer, Richter, Fletcher and Taylor 2008). In addition, there are 
significant differences between men and women in several aspects of migration, such 
as motivations, risks, norms (movement and assimilation), and consequences (Curran 
1995).  
                                                 
2 For the SOEP, see Gerd Wagner, Joachim Frick, and Jürgen Schupp (2007).  
3 Studies analyzing remittances in the context of savings support this view (Mathias Sinning 2007). 
  5Further insights have been gained by incorporating the recognition that 
migration decisions are not made by individuals, but conditioned by membership 
within households (Curran 1995). These studies on gender, households, and migration 
show that migration is not a unified family strategy influencing individual behavior. 
Rather, complex negotiations are carried out between family members, where the 
results are dependent upon the resources available to each family member. Cultural 
expectations associated with gender are both reproduced and transformed within the 
family. This perspective implies that migration is not only an adaptive reaction to 
external economic conditions but also the result of a gendered interaction within 
households and family and friend network (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Pierette 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).  
These insights have been reflected in several empirical studies that have made 
important steps in integrating a gender perspective into the literature on remittances 
by focusing on gender-specific strategic behavior (Alejandro Portes 1997; Patricia 
Pessar and Sarah Mahler 2003; Ninna Nyberg Sørenson 2005; Ramirez, Dominguez, 
and Morais 2005; Nicola Piper 2005; Jorgen Carling 2008). While Lucas and Stark 
(1985) found, in their seminal work on remittances, that women show a higher 
probability to remit, more recent studies have produced the opposite finding. Up to 
now, a few papers have come to the conclusion that women remit more than men 
(Lucas and Stark 1985; UNPFA and IOM 2006). One important finding is that men 
seem to remit mostly to their wives, while female migrants often send remittances to 
the person caring for their children (Amaia Pérez Orozco and Denise Paiewonsky 
2007; Amaia Pérez Orozco, Denise Paiewonsky, and Mar García Domínguez 2008). 
In addition, female migrants tend to remit to a wider circle of family members than 
men, while men send larger amounts of money than women (Moshe Semyonov and 
  6Anastasia Gorodzeisky 2005; Orozco, Lowell and Schneider 2006). Up to now, the 
link between transnational network, remittances, and integration into the economy of 
the destination country has inspired only few theoretical studies (Thomas Faist 2000; 
Ewa Morawska 2002).  
3.  Theoretical Considerations: First steps beyond the traditional models of 
remittances  
 
We would like to expand upon the findings described above by borrowing basic ideas 
from Benedicte de la Briere et al. (2002), who assume that the income of the 
immigrant and the income of the household left in the home country are not 
correlated. Accordingly, the immigrant can insure the household in the home country 
against negative income shocks. We augment these ideas through four additional 
assumptions. First, we assume that the immigrant belongs to a transnational network. 
This network consists of two different sub-networks: the network in the home country 
and the network in the destination country. Second, we assume that the immigrant 
operates as an insurer, not only for the household but also for a broader network in the 
home country. We assume that this network consists not only of family members but 
also of friends. Third, we assume that the network can influence, at least partly, its 
relative importance to the immigrant. The relative importance depends on the 
network’s relative size within the transnational network as well as on the structure of 
the network in the home country. Thus, if the spouse remains in the home country, the 
relative importance is high. If the spouse decides for chain migration, the structure of 
the network in the home country changes and its relative importance decreases. 
Fourth, we assume that the immigrant can spend her income on activities with the 
network in the country of destination (remittances) or share it with the network in the 
destination country.  
  7Further, the network in the home country of the immigrant earns income Y 
with a probability of   and income Y-with a probability of     1 , where  
represents a random negative income shock. The network in the home country wants 
to enter into an insurance contract with the immigrant. The immigrant is willing to 
pay remittances to the network left behind in the case of an income shock if the 
network agrees to pay a premium P (for example, to finance migration costs or to 
offer assistance in the case of return migration (remigration costs)). We assume that 
the network in the home country is maximizing its utility  (.) and acts as principal, 
taking into account the situation of the immigrant. The immigrant’s utility function is 
u(.). 
The network in the home country chooses the amount of premium (P) paid to 
the immigrant. In addition, it can influence its own relative importance to the 
immigrant, ,with  + =1 and   is the relative importance of the network in the 
destination country. This relative importance is crucial to the amount remitted, R, by 
the immigrant, since R = *Z with Z is the income of the immigrant in the 
destination country. From the point of view of the migrant the importance of the 
network in the home country ( ) can become zero if emigration takes place out of 
strong personal reasons such as separation, divorce or violence. However, in this 
model it is assumed that, the network in the home country tries to maximize its utility 
by choosing P and      
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In other words, the premium paid to the immigrant increases with the relative 
importance of the network, the income of network in the home country, and the 
income of the immigrant. The premium decreases with the size of the (expected) 
income shock. In case of an (expected) huge income shock, it might be rational for the 
network not to lower the income by a premium but to pay a lower premium—
especially if it can be expected that the remittance will not totally compensate for this 
shock.  
In addition, the network in the home country can influence its relative 
importance to the immigrant. According to our theoretical considerations   increases 
with the size of the (expected) income shock and the premium. It decreases with the 
income of the network in the home country and with the income of the immigrant. 
This results from the fact that remittances are based on   and the income of the 
immigrant. A certain amount of remittances can be realized by a high value of   and 
a comparably low income of the immigrant or with a low value of   and high income 
of the immigrant.  
 



















Thus the reduced form for R* will be 
                                                 
4 Constrainted by:  ) ln( ) ln( ) 1 ( ) ln( Z Z P Z P Z          ,  
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In other words, remittances received by the network in the home country will 
depend on the risk premium paid to the immigrant, the income of the immigrant, the 
size of the income shock in the home country, the income of the network in the home 
country and the relative importance of the network in the home country for the 
migrant. These parameters are reflected in the value of  , the relative importance of 
the network in the home country for the immigrant. 
Obviously, in such a complex context, gender matters. First, the propensity to 
remit money to different network members in the home country might differ by 
gender. It could be argued based on cursory evidence that female immigrants tend to 
send less money home due solely to the gender pay gap. From international studies, 
we know that women typically have more limited financial resources to remit on 
average. This again might lead to lower premiums paid to the immigrant by the 
network—thus, lower remittances are the result. Accordingly, we can derive our first 
hypothesis: women remit smaller amounts of money than men (Hypothesis 1).  
The social network abroad is rather complex and might differ between 
individual immigrants. Thus the composition of the transnational network has an 
impact on the amount remitted (Hypothesis 2). In addition, we have to treat the 
linkages between gender effects and the structure of transnational network carefully. 
From the perspective of the immigrant remittances constitute a withdrawal from 
potential resources. According to our conceptual framework, the relative importance 
of the network in the home country has a positive impact on remittances. As long as 
spouses are living abroad, comparably high remittances can be expected. Specific 
patterns of remittances sent by women might, however, be due to the fact that men 
and women have different functions in a transnational network. From international 
  10studies, it is well known that men typically support wives and children left in the 
home country. Women, on the other hand, either take younger children with them or 
leave them with other (female) network members in the home country. Consequently, 
they tend to send money to the caregivers. Migrants may also be retaining ties not 
with the whole network in the home country, but with particular individuals (Dorrit 
Posel 2001). In addition, the position of the immigrant within the network seems to 
matter—the amount of remittances depends on whether they are sent by a daughter, 
wife, mother, or head of household (Curran 1995).  
From international studies, we know that in the group of immigrants the 
percentage of married males with families in the home country is higher than it is 
among women. In addition, many studies indicate that migration and remittances 
themselves have significant effects on a woman's relative position in the transnational 
network (Carlota Ramirez 2005; Orozco, Lowell, and Schneider 2006; Rachel 
Connelly, Kenneth Roberts, and Zhenzhen Zheng 2010). From international 
experience we know: ”Women’s mobility varied according to their position in the 
household. Married women could not move at will –their husband’s power in this 
regard was clearly apparent. Unmarried women were freer to move, but depended on 
their position and conditions within the household. They are frequently constraint by 
their roles as care-givers – responsibility for children, the sick and disable, and for old 
parents” (Alison Todes 2001:17, 18). Therefore, the amount of remittances depends 
on the relative position of the immigrant in the transnational network and the relative 
importance of the network abroad compared to the network in the destination country 
(Hypothesis 3).  
The immigrant’s integration in the destination country provides an important 
key to understanding patterns of remittance behavior, and it is one that changes the 
  11overall network structure. The immigrant’s acquisition of destination country 
citizenship has far-reaching implications—not only for the individual immigrant but 
for the entire network of family and friends. On the one hand, this can be understood 
as an indicator of integration in the destination country that leads to a reduction in the 
relative importance of the network in the home country. In addition, it makes chain 
migration and family reunification much easier. This, again, results in a decreased 
importance of the network in the home country for immigrant’s social life – at the 
same time the importance of the network in the destination country increases. The 
effect of acquiring citizenship on the decision to remit is rather large and works the 
same way for both men and women.
5 Therefore, we expect that gender effects on 
remittances are not relevant in the group of immigrants with German citizenship 
(Hypothesis 4).  
4.  Data, subgroups, variables, and method  
 
As shown above, the multifaceted process of migration and remittances is impossible 
to understand by means of one or two broad indicators. It requires the consideration of 
a complex set of individual-level factors: human and social capital, networks in the 
home country and in the country of destination. In the following, we use indicators 
from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP 2001-06) to test the stated hypotheses for 
Germany. This representative German household survey contains a complex set of 
objective and subjective indicators on social status, labor market issues, attitudes, and 
many other aspects of daily life. The micro data was gathered mainly through face-to-
                                                 
5 However, (social) networks may assume different forms and functions for women and for men that 
affect settlement outcomes differentially, particularly the acquisition of destination country citizenship 
(see Jacqueline M. Hagan 1998). 
  12face interviews, with all members in the household since 1984. In 2001, the survey 
contained 11,947 households with 22,351 respondents from West and East Germany.
6 
Immigrants with and without German citizenship 
In 2006, about 6.7 million foreigners were living in Germany—3.3 million of 
them women (Federal Statistical Office 2010). For a long time, the citizenship of a 
child born in Germany was determined solely by the parent’s citizenship.
7 Due to the 
legal framework, many of the people with foreign citizenship living in Germany did 
not personally experience migration—they were born as in Germany with foreign 
citizenship. The total number of foreigners living in Germany has decreased over the 
last decade. During the same period, female migration to Germany has increased 
(Federal Statistical Office 2010). Today, women make up 49 percent of all foreigners 
living in Germany, although the proportion varies significantly by home country. 
While many foreigners were born in Germany, many Germans do have a migration 
background or even a personal migration history: they received foreign citizenship at 
birth and became Germans later in life. In general, the propensity to acquire the 
German citizenship has been decreasing in recent years. In 2009, only about 96,000 
foreigners received German citizenship. The majority of these were female (Federal 
Statistical Office 2010).  
We therefore differentiate immigrants into two subgroups (1) “immigrants 
with foreign citizenship (in the following also referred to as foreigners)” and (2) 
“immigrants with German citizenship,” who were born with foreign citizenship but 
                                                 
6 For sample size information on the SOEP, see Joachim Frick and Ingo Siebert (2010), and for 
attrition, see Martin Kroh (2010). 
7 Only since 2000 can a child attain German citizenship by being born in Germany even if neither 
parent is German. One precondition is that one parent has been a legal resident in Germany for eight 
years and has a right of unlimited residence or an unlimited residence permit for three years. 
  13acquired German citizenship later.
8 Both groups make up about 15 percent of our 
SOEP sample members (Appendix, Table A1). The total sample contains 19,800 
observations for 5,203 immigrants, of whom 2,650 are women.
9 More than half of the 
immigrant subsample is made up of immigrants with foreign citizenship. Citizens of 
Turkey, Italy, and the Ex-Yugoslavian countries make up about two-thirds of all 
foreigner observations in our sample (Appendix, Table A2). The share of immigrants 
is in line with the official data from the Federal Statistical Office (2010). 
Measuring the amount of remittances, human capital, and networks 
Our dependent variable is the “amount of remittances” measured in Euro. 
Remittances are defined as individual transnational transfers. We therefore use the 
retrospective question in the SOEP questionnaire: “Have you personally provided 
payments or support during the last year (2001) to relatives or other persons outside 
of your household? How much in the year as a whole? Where does the recipient live? 
In  Germany or abroad?”
  10 All respondents are asked to state whether they 
transferred money, to whom, and how much. If they did not make transfers, they 
check the box: “No, I have not given any payment or support.” Their answers provide 
individual information not only on who makes transfers but also on the amount 
transferred.  
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the numbers of immigrants with foreign and 
German citizenship as well as the share of remittances in the years 2001 to 2006. We 
include only respondents aged 18 and over. Dividing immigrants by citizenship 
reveals that about 9 to 12 percent of those with German citizenship and 11 to 16 
percent of those with foreign citizenship send money home. Overall 2,076 
                                                 
8 Based on the questions: Is your nationality German? Have you had German nationality since birth or 
did you acquire it at a later date? What is your citizenship? 
9  N=2,820 observations for immigrants with German citizenship (N= 1,458 women) and N= 2,383 
observations with foreign citizenship (N= 1,192 women). 
10 For details, see: http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.222729.en/questionnaires.html 
  14observations for remittances were made during the period but only 1,995 for the 
amount of remittances. As we only lost about 8 percent of the observations over all 
years due to missing information on the place of payment, we decided not to impute 
or substitute missing values.
11  
Based on our theoretical arguments and findings from the literature, we use 
several variables as indicators. The Appendix (Table A2) lists the minimum, 
maximum, means, and standard deviations for all (micro) individual-level 
independent variables for all immigrants.
12 Life cycle effects are measured by the age 
of respondents (measured in years). To examine the possibility of a curvilinear 
relationship—that is, the possibility that the amount of remittances decreases for the 
very old—we include a quadratic variable for age in our models. To capture the 
applicability of social transfers and social responsibility for a broader family, we 
include an indicator of whether the respondent is currently living in a legal 
partnership or not. Since single-earner households may have different remittance 
patterns than multiple-earner households, we include not only the monthly individual 
net labor income but also the monthly family net income (household income minus 
individual income).
13 To ensure that we capture the role of employment selectivity on 
remittances the years in education are included. We also use the number of children 
aged 14 and below to get more information on the household composition in 
Germany. Further indicators for the network in destination country include the 
number of adult household members. One relevant indicator is the network in the 
home country, which is based on the question, “Do you have family members or close 
                                                 
11 N=1,559 missing values on remittances. The female share in the missing value is about 46 percent.  
12 The highest correlation for our independent variables is found for children below 14 years in 
household and age (-0.4181***). 
13 We weighted the monthly net family income net family income (household income minus individual 
income) using the equivalent scale given by OECD: 1 for first adult person, 0,5 for each additional 
adult person and 0,3 for each child. 
  15friends in the home country you (or your family) come from? Persons in Native 
Country: Who are they?”
14. This information is supplemented with indicators on 
family network abroad for the years 2001 and 2006.
15  
After excluding all missing information on dependent and independent 
variables, the pooled data set (2001-06) for analysis contains 6,476 observations for 
immigrants with foreign citizenship and 3,655 observations for immigrants with 
German citizenship.  
Estimation method 
We use pooled data because the sample contains few immigrants who state 
that they remit, as reflected in the low numbers of respondents with remittances over 
the six years. It seems likely that some the immigrants did not send transfers abroad. 
Thus, not all immigrants remitted within the time period: those who did not were 
assigned a zero, which is why the data set contains many zeros. For all other 
respondents, we included the amount of remittances. Since we attempt to explain the 
transfer amount given, one way to tackle this problem is to use a Tobit model (James 
Tobin 1958), which has been applied in previous studies on transfers (Merkle and 
Zimmermann 1992; Edgard Rodriguez 1996; François-Charles Wolff, Seymour 
Spilerman, and Claudine Attias-Donfut 2007; Sinning 2007; Sencer Ecer and Andrea 
Tompkins 2010). In the Tobit model, the zero-inflated nature of our dependent 
variable is considered as a corner solution outcome because the stochastic process that 
describes the individual decision to send transfers abroad and the one that governs the 
decision about the amount of transfers do not differ. Therefore, to deal with non-
remitters and to account for the censored nature of the dependent variable, we perform 
                                                 
14 However, this variable is not defined for new entrants starting 2001. 
15 Reply to the question: “And now about your close and extended family. Which of the following 
family members do you have?” For each, the respondent could indicate the number and whether they 
live in Germany or abroad. 
  16estimations of Tobit models, which enable us to analyze the determinants of the 
positive amount by assuming non-remitters as left-censored. 
Using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test after OLS justifies 
running a random effects model. However, when testing for correlation of ui and xit 
using the Hausman test, we had to reject the H0. But we decided to run a random 
effects model because we are interested in time-invariant effects such as sex and the 
family network, which do not vary substantially over the observation period. Also we 
are not interested in variance within but between respondents. We therefore estimate 
Tobit models with a random effects specification to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the individual level.  
5.  Empirical Results 
 
Before turning to remittance behavior, we first analyze the basic motivation behind 
migration to Germany. We focus on the basic question of whether remitting money 
forms a crucial motivation behind the decision to migrate. In contrast to standard 
studies (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 
Bank 2011), we find that remittances are not the main driving force behind migration 
to Germany (Table 1).
16 In addition, there are gender-specific differences. Many more 
females than males migrate to Germany for family reunification. Furthermore, only 6 
percent of the female immigrants say that “earning money and supporting family” was 
a major motivation for migration. The corresponding figure for males was 10 percent 
in 2006. The general structure of the motivation to migrate seems to be relative stable 
                                                 
16 First-time respondents have to answer the question “There are many possible reasons for moving to 
Germany. Which of the following reasons played a role in your decision?” in the SOEP Biography 
Questionnaire (see Jan Goebel and Anke Böckenhoff 2009). Answer categories include: “I wanted a 
better life: I wanted a better home, to be able to buy more, etc, I wanted to work and earn money in 
Germany in order to support my family and save money, I wanted freedom, I wanted to live with my 
family (spouse, parents, children), There was severe poverty in my native country, I could not live in 
safety in my native country (persecution, war), I just wanted to live in Germany.”   
  17over time. This holds true for the observed gender differences as well. Consequently, 
we can expect that standard theoretical models explaining remittances and migration 
by economic considerations cannot explain the determinants of remittances from 
Germany. Furthermore, since family reunification and the quality of life in Germany 
are important factors behind migration, theoretical models based on networks and 
integration may explain remittances better than standard economic arguments.  
 
Table 1  
Reasons to migrate to Germany for all immigrants by sex for the years 2001-06  
 
      2001     2006 
          Women  Men             Women           Men 
Reasons:       (in  percent) 
      Family  reunification    24   18   25   19 
      Better  life       15   16   14   15 
   Just want to live in Germany  15    13    15    14 
   Live in freedom       12    14    12    14 
   Poverty in the country of  origin    8   9   8   9 
   War in the country of origin  8    9    7    8 
   Earn money in Germany and  
   Support family (remittances)  6    11    6    10 
   Other reasons (not classified)  11    11    12    11 
 
Total      100   100   100   100 
Total  (N)     1,354   1,257   1,018   864 
Valid  cases  (N)    787   692   590   478 
Note: Results are not weighted; multiple responses, N=19 800 immigrants. 
 
 
Table 2 provides some basic information about the average and median of the 
annual amount of remittances sent by men and women, separated by immigrants with 
foreign and German citizenship. In general, those with foreign citizenship remit more 
money than those with German citizenship. This finding holds true for both women 
and men. The legal status of the immigrant has a great influence on the decision to 
remit. After naturalization, family reunification in Germany becomes much easier, 
  18and close family members receive direct or indirect access to the German welfare 
system. Consequently, remittances decrease.  
However, in both groups, women remit less money than men. In 2006, the 
average amount remitted by women with foreign citizenship accounted for only about 
50 percent of the average amount remitted by men with foreign citizenship. However, 
women remit a higher share of their own labor income than men, as shown in Table 2. 
In addition, we know from international studies that women tend to make more non-
monetary and social remittances than men. Women more often remit food, clothes, 
and household items and also provide a greater variety of types of support (Leah 
Karin VanWey 2004). Women also tend to be less involved in investment projects, as 
they often have less access to the formal economy. Despite the fact that we do not 
have sufficient data to prove these assumptions for Germany, they have to be 
considered when discussing and interpreting monetary remittances. 
 
Table 2  
Amount of remittances sent abroad and remittance-income relation by subgroup and 
sex for the years 2001-06  
 
  Sum    Sum    Median  of  remittance/ 
  mean    median    income  relation 
  (in  euro)   (in  euro)   (in  percent) 
    2001 2006   2001 2006   2001 2006 
 
Immigrants with German citizenship  
 
Women  831 968   511 500   3.8  3.3 
Men   1,634  1,034   767  600   3.1  2.0 
        
Immigrants with foreign citizenship  
 
Women  1,545 1,539   1,023 1,000   7.5  6.5 
Men    2,153 3,165   1,023 1,500   4.4  4.5 
Note: Respondents older than 18 years living in private households; results are weighted for mean; 
remittance-income relation is calculated by division of annual remittances by annual individual labor 




  19We proceed in several steps: First, we estimate a “core” equation, which gives 
insights to the explanatory power of our indicators (Models A and B). Second, since 
we want to obtain further insights into network effects in remittances, we estimate an 
extended model by adding indicators on the network in the home country (Models C 
and D).
17 All models are shown in table 3. Third, and most important, we use the full 
model and introduce (gender) interaction terms to check for differences in the amount 
remitted between men and women in the explanatory variables (Models E and F). For 
all models, we present marginal effects (to the mean), significance, standard errors, 
and log-likelihood for model fit.
18  
Overall we expect different remittances patterns due to integration outcomes 
in the country of destination, that’s why all the models are estimated separately for 
immigrants with foreign citizenship and with German citizenship. Since one cannot 
presume that the coefficients of both groups differ statistically significantly, we tested 
differences in coefficients. The Chow test justified separate regressions for 
immigrants with foreign citizenship and immigrants with German citizenship (results 
are shown in Notes Table 3). Thus, both groups show different pattern in amount of 
remittances.  
Among immigrants with foreign citizenship, our first hypothesis is confirmed: 
women remit significantly lower amounts of money than men (Table 3, Model A). 
Further, older or better educated immigrants with foreign citizenship give more 
money then younger or those with lower education level. Being married as an 
indicator of social responsibility for a broader family leads to higher remittances. The 
                                                 
17 We can provide the estimates among women and among men on request. 
18 The tables presented show standard errors: “Standard errors are considered essential because they 
provide an estimate of the extent of variation or uncertainty around the point estimate, allowing readers 
to exercise caution in interpreting a coefficient with a large estimated standard error.” (Yana Rodgers 
and Jane Miller 2008: 129). 
 
  20same holds true for higher individual and household income. Network indicators of 
the destination country show that with increasing number of adult household members 
and increasing number of children below the age of 14 in Germany the amount of 
remittances send abroad decreases. This is also the case with the time spend in 
Germany: The longer the immigrant with foreign citizenship lives in Germany, the 
more likely the chain migration of further family members, the lower the amount of 
remittances. Indeed, we see that those willing to return to the home country give more 
money aboard than those who want to stay in Germany. All in all, the results reported 
support the view that remittances can be at least partly considered as a tool for 
international insurance and risk diversification within a transnational network. Now 
we check the explanatory power of the network in the home country for immigrants 
with foreign citizenship (Table 3, Model C). Basically, we find that having a close 
family network, consisting of parents, children, spouses and other relatives (such as 
aunt and uncle), in the home country leads to higher remittances for immigrants with 
foreign citizenship. In contrast, having friends in the home country has no significant 
impact on amount of remittances. Those immigrants with foreign citizenship in 
Germany who have spouses or children abroad give the most money.  
Thus the composition of the transnational network has an impact on the 
amount remitted. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. However, even if the network in the 
home country is considered, gender differences in amount of remittances send remain 
for immigrants with foreign citizenship. In other words, taking immigrants with 
foreign citizenship, gender differences in remitting cannot be explained completely by 
the existence of the network.  
Our findings show remarkable differences in the remittance patterns among 
immigrants with German citizenship. Immigrant women with German citizenship do 
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not give less money abroad than men (Table 3, Model B). This confirms hypothesis 4, 
which states that gender effects on remittances are not as important in the group of 
immigrants with German citizenship. Therefore, we can assume that the acquisition of 
German citizenship dominates the overall decision to remit. Referring to our 
theoretical considerations, it can be argued that the relative importance of the network 
in the home country decreases with naturalization. Males and females are affected by 
this in a similar way. Turning now to the results of the model with network variables, 
two findings are of interest: having a spouse in the home country does not lead to 
higher remittances but having siblings and friends, next to parents and children, 
abroad increases the amount of remittances (Table 3, Model D). Since family 
reunification is comparably easy for this group, living in two countries might be a 
conscious decision not to live together but to be independent. Our finding might 
therefore result empirically from partnership features. However, what is important is 
that the network in the home country is important for explaining remittances and if the 
structure of the network in the home country changes the remittances change.   
 
 
 Table 3  Determinants of (ln) amount of remittances for years 2001-06: Core models A and B and network models C and D 
  Immigrants with foreign citizenship  Immigrants with German citizenship 
    (Model A)  (Model C)  (Model B)    (Model D) 
Women -0.274  -0.275  -0.206  -0.198 
 (0.127)**  (0.123)**  (0.134)  (0.129) 
Age 0.136  0.110  0.074  0.043 
 (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.027)***  (0.027) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000) 
Married 0.272  0.377  0.435  0.440 
 (0.148)*  (0.145)**  (0.152)**  (0.149)** 
Years in education  0.050  0.052  0.091  0.077 
 (0.025)**  (0.024)**  (0.028)**  (0.027)** 
(ln) Monthly individual labour income  0.095  0.093  0.076  0.073 
 (0.015)***  (0.014)***  (0.017)***  (0.017)*** 
(ln) Monthly net equivalent family income  0.050  0.047  0.064  0.057 
 (0.029)*  (0.029)  (0.036)*  (0.035) 
Relative duration of stay  -1.343  -1.028  -1.647  -1.514 
 (0.287)***  (0.297)***  (0.353)***  (0.349)*** 
Remigration plans  0.208  0.163  0.441  0.354 
 (0.081)**  (0.079)**  (0.179)**  (0.172)** 
Household size in Germany  -0.143  -0.117  -0.118  -0.107 
 (0.054)**  (0.052)**  (0.056)**  (0.055)** 
Number of children aged 14 and below  -0.231  -0.219  0.025  0.015 
in Germany  (0.059)***  (0.057)***  (0.058)  (0.056) 
 
(Grand)Parents abroad    0.272    0.328 
   (0.127)**    (0.161)** 
Children abroad     0.949    0.661 
   (0.198)***    (0.298)** 
Siblings abroad     -0.063    0.402 
   (0.117)    (0.150)** 
  to be continued   24 
 
Table 3 Continued 
 
  Immigrants with foreign citizenship  Immigrants with German citizenship 
    (Model A)  (Model C)  (Model B)    (Model D) 
Spouses abroad     1.590    0.552 
   (0.640)**    (0.912) 
Other relatives abroad    0.378    0.341 
   (0.109)***    (0.145)** 
Friends abroad     0.177    0.377 
   (0.270)    (0.227)* 
N observations  6,476  6,476  3,655  3,655 
N respondents  1,628  1,628  1,179  1,179 
Log-likelihood -4,304.51  -4,272.02  -3,012.33  -2,983.19 
Note: Marginal effects dy/dx after xttobit (y = E(log amount remittances| log amount remittances>0) (predict, e0(0, .)) (Model A and B: 5.537 for immigrants with foreign 
citizenship and 4.886 for immigrants with German citizenship) (Model C and D: 5.325 for immigrants with foreign citizenship and 4.704 for immigrants with German 
citizenship); Standard errors in parentheses;  
Chow-Test for differences in coefficients for immigrants with foreign citizenship:  (1) Core model (A/B) chi2=52.73, p-value=0.000, df=19; (2) network model (C/D) 
chi2=74.51, p-value=0.000, df=25;  
The regression also includes five-year dummies and two flags for imputation of income, are not shown in table.  
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 So far, we have analyzed the different network effects. But, are there 
differences in remittances behavior between men and women? So far, we have shown 
that immigrant women with foreign citizenship give lower amounts of money abroad 
than their male counterparts. But what does this mean with respect to the transnational 
network? And do our results mean that the amount remitted by immigrants with 
German citizenship does not follow gender-specific patterns? To answer this question, 
we add (gender) interaction terms for all variables of interest (Table 4). Looking at the 
two groups of immigrants with foreign citizenship and with German citizenship, we 
can identify gender-specific network effects on the amount of remittances.
19  
We find that with an increasing number of household members in Germany, 
immigrant women with foreign citizenship remit less than men. In contrast, if they 
have parents abroad, they remit more than men. This finding is especially interesting 
when taking into account that women remit less than men if children are abroad. 
Putting both results together might shed some light on this apparent conundrum. 
Women are less likely to migrate if they have to leave a small child in the home 
country than men. But if they make this choice, someone has to care for the children. 
It can be assumed that close relatives such as parents often take on this responsibility. 
A second interesting finding is that immigrant women with foreign citizenship remit 
less than men if they have remigration plans. According to our conceptual framework, 
remittances depend on the income of the immigrant and the relative importance and 
premium of the network in the home country. A lower premium leads to lower 
remittances. In general, the premium consists of payments to finance migration and 
the promise to support the immigrant in the case of remigration. The willingness to 
                                                 
19 The Chow test justified separate regressions for men and women for immigrants with German 
citizenship but not for immigrants with foreign citizenship (results are shown in Notes, Table 4). 
 Table 4  
Determinants of (ln) amount of remittances for years 2001-06:  
Network models E and F with interaction terms  
 
 
Immigrants with            Immigrants with 
  foreign citizenship         German citizenship 
 (Model  E)                      (Model F) 
 
Women 1.333  -0.577 
 (1.510)  (1.355) 
Age 0.148  0.029 
 (0.045)***  (0.039) 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000) 
Married 0.260  0.508 
 (0.202)  (0.246)** 
Years in education  0.050  0.092 
 (0.034)  (0.044)** 
(ln) Monthly individual labor Income  0.084  0.128 
 (0.021)***  (0.032)*** 
(ln) Monthly net equivalent family income  0.021  0.021 
 (0.034)  (0.042) 
Relative duration of stay  -0.658  -1.339 
 (0.398)*  (0.501)** 
Remigration plans  0.278  0.679 
 (0.108)**  (0.273)** 
Household size in Germany  -0.045  -0.163 
 (0.067)  (0.081)** 
Number of children aged 14 and below  -0.187  0.015 
in Germany  (0.076)**  (0.075) 
 
(Grand)Parents abroad  0.055  0.515 
 (0.167)  (0.246)** 
Children abroad   1.203  0.953 
 (0.280)***  (0.460)** 
Siblings abroad  0.016  0.279 
 (0.153)  (0.219) 
Spouses abroad  1.996  -3.151 
 (0.943)**  (23.041) 
Other relatives abroad  0.357  0.493 
 (0.147)**  (0.219)** 
Friends abroad  0.656  0.175 
 (0.457)  (0.306) 
 
    to be continued 
 
 
  26Table 4 Continued 
Immigrants with             Immigrants with 
  foreign citizenship         German citizenship 
   (Model  E)                      (Model F) 
Interaction Terms     
    
Age * women  -0.068  0.018 
 (0.064)  (0.052) 
Age squared * women  0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Married * women  0.222  -0.152 
 (0.316)  (0.324) 
Years in education * women  -0.012  -0.025 
 (0.048)  (0.054) 
Ind. labor income * women  0.022  -0.102 
 (0.029)  (0.037)** 
Family income * women  0.085  0.147 
 (0.068)  (0.078)* 
Relative duration of stay * women  -0.691  -0.419 
 (0.582)  (0.618) 
Remigration plans * women   -0.248  -0.490 
 (0.149)*  (0.272)* 
Household size in Germany * women   -0.194  0.106 
 (0.106)*  (0.108) 
Number of children * women  -0.076  -0.068 
 (0.115)  (0.112) 
(Grand)Parents abroad * women   0.513  -0.316 
 (0.271)*  (0.282) 
Children abroad * women   -0.473  -0.402 
 (0.284)*  (0.427) 
Siblings abroad * women   -0.171  0.143 
 (0.226)  (0.290) 
Spouses abroad * women   -0.598  35.984 
 (0.721)  (882.390) 
Other relatives abroad * women   0.017  -0.250 
 (0.214)  (0.258) 
Friends abroad * women   -0.716  0.365 
 (0.412)*  (0.449) 
 
N observations  6,476  3,655 
N respondents  1,628  1,179 
Log-likelihood -4,260.67  -2,964.76 
Note: Marginal effects dy/dx after xttobit (y = E(log amount remittances| log amount remittances>0) 
(predict, e0(0, .)) (5.238 for immigrants with foreign citizenship and 4.570 for immigrants with German 
citizenship); Standard errors in parentheses;  
Chow-Test for differences in coefficients for women (1) immigrants with foreign citizenship: 
chi2=27.07, p-value=0.103, df=19; (2) immigrants with German citizenship: chi2=34.01, p-value= 
0.018, df=19 (without year dummies);  
The regression further includes year dummies and flags for imputation of income, not shown in table.  
* p< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
  27pay a premium depends on the expected remittances. Due to the existing 
gender pay gap in Germany, it is rational from the point of view of the network in the 
home country that it expects lower remittances by females than by males. If expected 
remittances are lower for female migration, it makes sense to also cut the premium 
paid. This gives rise to an interesting gender specific circle and might explain at least 
partly gender specific remittances patterns. The results confirm hypothesis 3 that the 
amount of remittances depends on the relative position of the immigrant in the 
transnational network and the relative importance of the network abroad for the 
immigrant.  
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
Our findings show that in Germany, family reunification is a much more important 
motivation for women to migrate than for men. Family reunification has an enormous 
impact on the overall structure of the immigrant’s transnational network. Typically, 
family reunification in the immigrant’s destination country decreases the number of 
network members in the home country. This might reduce the necessity to make 
remittances to remaining network members.    
In this paper, we have developed a basic theoretical framework that allows us 
to analyze gender-specific network effects on remittances. Remittances depend not 
only on the income situation of the immigrant and the network in the home country, 
but also on the relative importance of the network members in the immigrant’s social 
life. In addition, the network can increase the incentives for remittances by paying the 
immigrant a certain “premium.” In practice, this premium could help the immigrant to 
cover migration and possible remigration costs.  
  28In the empirical part of the paper, we have identified a link between gender 
and remittances in the group of foreigners but not in the group of immigrants with 
German citizenship. This could be due to the fact that acquisition of German 
citizenship makes family reunification easier while simultaneously decreasing the 
number of network members in the home country. As a result, the overall importance 
of remittances decreases. In addition, we have shown that the composition and 
structure of the network abroad influences remittances. In the group of foreigners, 
significantly more money is remitted if members of the immediate family live abroad. 
In contrast, in the case of immigrants with German citizenship, the existence of a 
broader network plays an important role.  
In the case of foreigners, the gender effect becomes insignificant when we 
introduce gender interaction terms that allow us to better understand gender-specific 
remittance patterns. We find that females remit less than males if they have children 
in the home country, while they remit more than males if (grand)parents are living 
abroad. Unfortunately, our data set does not allow us to control for the age of children 
in the home country. However, from international studies, we know that women 
rarely leave their young children in the home country without caregivers. It can 
therefore be assumed that women remit money for younger children to close family 
members. In addition, it can be assumed that men leave small children in the home 
country more often than women. There also seems to be evidence that men leave a 
higher number of small children behind. However, again due to data restrictions, we 
were not able to analyze this phenomenon in greater depth.   
This study can be considered a first step in the analysis of remittances from the 
perspective of gender economics. The analysis of linkages between the structure of 
transnational networks and gender-specific remittance behavior also points to a 
  29potentially interesting direction for future research. One natural extension of this 
study would be a more in-depth investigation of the social determinants of 
remittances, possibly linking the networks literature to the economic literature on 
remittances. Such a study should analyze how the quality of the transnational network 
influences the decision to remit, and should also include a broader set of different 
forms of transfers, such as social remittances and in-kind transfers. 
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Table A1  
Number of respondents in the sample for years 2001-06 (SOEP) 
 
  
  All immigrants   Immigrants with German citizenship
1  Immigrants with foreign citizenship
2 
  
  N  Share  Share  N  N with  Share  N  N with    Share  
   total  women    remittances  remittances   remittances remittances 
    population       
    (in percent)  (in percent)      (in percent)      (in percent) 
2001 3,536  14.5  51.4  1,530  185  10.0  2,006  255  15.1 
2002 4,038  14.7  50.5  2,158  174  9.3  1,880  213  11.7 
2003 3,192  14.5  51.3  1,475  163  11.8  1,717  191  15.7 
2004 3,099  14.7  51.7  1,494  140  9.5  1,605  158  12.7 
2005 2,917  15.1  52.3  1,398  137  11.3  1,519  161  14.2 
2006 3,018  15.4  52.5  1,547  147  11.3  1,471  152  11.0 
Note: 1 “AussiedlerInnen” and respondents with German citizenship; 2 respondents with foreign citizenship; 
only respondents aged 18 and over; percentages are weighted; total N= 3 364 observations for transfers abroad for all respondents (incl. not immigrants) 2001-06;  







 Table A2  
Descriptive statistics for individual characteristics of all immigrants for the years 2001-06 (SOEP)  
 
Variable Description  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  SD 
Annual amount of remittances  Annual amount of payments to relatives  
(N=1,995)  (or other persons not living in household) (in euros)  5  99,999  1,709.64
 3,542.53 
      
Immigrants with foreign  Respondents with other than German nationality  0  1  0.52  0.49 
citizenship (N=10,198)   
               …with … citizenship  Turkish  0  1  0.33  0.47 
  Italian  0 1 0.16  0.37 
  Yugoslavian  0 1 0.16  0.37 
  Greek  0 1 0.09  0.28 
Immigrants with German citizenship  Naturalized citizens: Respondents received German   0  1  0.48  0.49 
  (N=9,602)  citizenship some time later (incl. ethnic Germans) 
        
Gender  Women  0 1 0.52  0.49 
Age  Age of respondents (in years)  18  97  45.03  16.42 
Marital status  Respondents who are legally married  0  1  0.73  0.45 
Years in education  Number of years respondent spend on schooling  7  18  10.99  2.59 
Monthly individual labor income  Monthly net individual labor income (in euro)  0  25,000  795.52
 1,077.99 
Equivalent family income  Monthly net equivalent “household income minus  
  individual income” (new OECD scale) (in euro)  1  337,080  1,098.60
 3,436.31 
Relative duration of stay  Duration of German residence divided by age in years  0.03  1.00  0.51  0.23 
Remigration plan  Respondents who wish to return to the country of origin  0  1  0.24  0.43 
Household size in Germany  Number of person living in household (only adult  
  Household members, aged 15 and above)  1  9  2.53  1.06 
Children in Germany  Number of children aged 14 and below in  
  Household in Germany  0  7  0.64  1.00 
  to be continued 
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Table A2 Continued 
 
Variable Description  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  SD 
(Grand)Parents abroad  Respondent has parents or grandparents 
  living  abroad  0 1 0.32  0.47 
Children abroad  Respondent has children or grandchildren  
  living  abroad  0 1 0.08  0.27 
Spouse abroad  Respondent has spouse or partner living abroad  0  1  0.01  0.10 
Siblings abroad  Respondent has sibling living abroad  0  1  0.37  0.48 
Other relatives abroad  Respondent has other relatives  
  (e.g., aunt, uncle, nice) living abroad  0  1  0.38  0.48 
Friends abroad  Respondent has friends living abroad  0  1  0.06  0.24 
Note: Only respondents aged 18 and over for all immigrants (immigrants with foreign and German citizenship); N=19800, Results not weighted. 
  
 
 
 
 
 